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Abstract—Despite the great success of deep neural networks,
the adversarial attack can cheat some well-trained classifiers
by small permutations. In this paper, we propose another type
of adversarial attack that can cheat classifiers by significant
changes. For example, we can significantly change a face but
well-trained neural networks still recognize the adversarial and
the original example as the same person. Statistically, the existing
adversarial attack increases Type II error and the proposed one
aims at Type I error, which are hence named as Type II and
Type I adversarial attack, respectively. The two types of attack
are equally important but are essentially different, which are
intuitively explained and numerically evaluated. To implement
the proposed attack, a supervised variation autoencoder is
designed and then the classifier is attacked by updating the
latent variables using gradient information. Besides, with pre-
trained generative models, Type I attack on latent spaces is
investigated as well. Experimental results show that our method
is practical and effective to generate Type I adversarial examples
on large-scale image datasets. Most of these generated examples
can pass detectors designed for defending Type II attack and the
strengthening strategy is only efficient with a specific type attack,
both implying that the underlying reasons for Type I and Type
II attack are different.
Index Terms—adversarial attack, type I error, supervised
variational autoencoder
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, deep neural networks (DNN) have showngreat power on image classification [1], [2], segmentation
[3], and generation tasks [4], [5]. But many DNN models have
been found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples [6], [7],
[8], which prevents deploying DNNs in physical world, e.g.,
self-driving and surgical robotics. Adversarial attacks reveal
inconsistency between the trained DNNs and the oracle, even
when they have consensus performance on known examples.
This inconsistency shows that DNNs are over-sensitive to
adversarial perturbations [9] such that DNNs may incorrectly
alter their labels when polluted examples only have slight
difference from correctly classified ones. In form, it can be
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described as the following problem,
From x Generate x′ = A(x)
s.t. f1(x
′) 6= f1(x)
f2(x
′) = f2(x)
(1)
where f1 is the classifier to be attacked while f2 is the attacker,
which could be an oracle classifier, e.g., a group of human
annotators. In some literature [10], the last requirement, i.e.,
f2(x) = f2(x
′), is written as d(g2(x), g2(x′)) ≤ ε, which
requires the distance of x and x′ not exceed a threshold and
naturally leads to the same prediction by f2.
Study on adversarial attack is meaningful to investigate the
robustness of DNNs, which is crucial for many applications.
For instance, the generated examples, which are generally
hard for DNNs, are very valuable for enhancing the neural
networks. Moreover, the relationship between the original
example x and the adversarial one x′, as well as the generating
process, is of great importance and may result in insightful
understanding for the DNNs. Therefore, since its proposal,
adversarial attack, its defense, and its understanding have
attracted attention. For example, the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM, [6]) can generate adversarial examples in one step
via approximately linearizing the classifier. A powerful attack
algorithm with a high success rate is designed in [11] by
simultaneously minimizing the distortion of the input and the
distance between the output of DNNs and the target output.
Without loss of any generality, we can assume that the
original sample x has a positive label, i.e., f1(x) = f2(x) = 1
in (1), and regard the samples in other classes as negative.
Then via (1), we generate an example x′ such that f1(x′) =
−1, f2(x′) = 1. In this sense, (1) produces false negatives and
induces Type II error. Study on generating false negatives and
preventing Type II error is very important. There has been
great progress in the recent years; see, e.g., [6], [7], [10],
[12], [13], [14], [15]. However, Type II error is only one side
of a coin. Partially emphasizing (1) cannot lead to the ideal:
a constant function f1(x) = 1,∀x is immune to adversarial
attack (1) with ratio of false negatives being zero, but this
function is obviously not good. Statistically, Type I error,
corresponding to false positives, should be simultaneously
considered together with Type II error. Their cooperation gives
a comprehensive measurement for a classifier: in the extreme
case mentioned above, a constant function has no Type II error
but has a very high ratio for Type I error, and thus it is not a
good classifier.
Adversarial attacks (1), which are to increase Type II error
by generating false negatives, have attracted increasing atten-
tion recently. But the discussion for Type I error is missing. For
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2Type I error, we focus on false positives, i.e., from an example
x with f1(x) = f2(x) = 1, we generate an adversarial example
x′ such that f1(x′) = 1 but f2(x′) = −1. Mathematically,
From x Generate x′ = A(x)
s.t. f1(x
′) = f1(x)
f2(x
′) 6= f2(x).
(2)
Adversarial attack relies on inconsistency between the attacked
classifier and the attacker. For (1), a small change from x to x′
that has no difference in the view of f2 leads to a sign reversal
of f1. While the new attack (2) shows another inconsistency:
f1 has no response to significant changes happened in f2. An
intuitive example is given in Fig.1, where a classifier trained on
MNIST with 98.64% test accuracy is attacked. Starting from
a “3” that is correctly identified, i) by (1), we slightly disturb
it such that the adversarial digit is still “3” but is identified as
“8”; ii) by (2), we really change it to an “8” but f1 remains
as before: the classifier thinks of the adversarial digit as “3”.
0 1
1
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P
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Type II
Type I
p(f1 = 3) = 1.0
p(f1 = 3) = 0.0
p(f1 = 8) = 1.0
p(f1 = 3) = 1.0
1
Fig. 1. Relationship between Type I and Type II adversarial attacks on ROC
curve of f1. Through viewing number “3” as true sample and others as false
samples, Type II attack aims to decrease the true positive rate (TPR), while
Type I attack tries to increase the false positive rate (FPR)
The existing attack (1) and the proposed one (2) aim at Type
II and Type I error and thus they are called adversarial attack
Type II and adversarial attack Type I, respectively. They are
equally important and irreplaceable. One may argue that Type
I and Type II attack can be implemented by each other. For
example, one can generate an “8” that is incorrectly identified
as “3” from a correct “8” by the existing Type II attack
methods, which however requires another example and hence
violates (2). The underlying reasons and the corresponding
defects of the classifier for Type I and Type II attack are
different, which will be detailed in Section II. As a result,
many defense methods designed for the existing Type II attack
do not work for the proposal Type I attack, which will be
shown in Section IV.
Different to Type II attack, where the variant from the orig-
inal example is quite small, Type I attack requires significant
change to transform the true label. Generally, it is more hard
since adding noise does not work for Type I attack. In this
paper, we design a supervised variational autoencoder (SVAE)
model, which is the supervised extension from original vari-
ational autoencoder (VAE) [5]. Based on prior knowledge
on Gaussian distribution, embedding label information in the
latent space can capture the features. Then on the latent space,
we attack the classifier by updating the latent variables by a
gradient descent method, which forwards propagates through
a decoder to recover the revised latent variables into images.
Benefiting from the Gaussian restriction in the latent space and
inspired by adversarial autoencoder [16], a discriminator is
added to estimate the distribution of the manifold in the latent
space and then to successfully implement Type I attack. Note
that the Type I attack is not restricted to VAE architecture.
Any framework that can transfer the input to a controllable
latent space, which means that the samples are expected to
follow a known distribution after coding, is possible to conduct
Type I attack. In this paper, experiments on AC-GAN [17] and
StyleGAN [18] for Type I attack on latent spaces (attack on
latent space is designed in [15] for Type II attack) are provided.
Other auto-encoder methods and generative models, including
[4] [19] [20] [21] [22], are also promising for generating Type
I adversarial examples.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
Type I adversarial attack is proposed and its link to Type II
attack is discussed. The techniques of Type I adversarial attack
are given in Section III. Section IV evaluates the proposed
attack on digits and face recognition tasks. The performance
under defence designed for Type II attack is also reported,
showing essential difference between Type I and Type II
attack. In Section V, a conclusion is given to end this paper.
II. TYPE I ATTACK AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO TYPE II
Deep neural networks have shown powerful fitting capa-
bility on training set. Although f1 and f2 have very similar
performance on known data, they are still different and the
inconsistency could be exposed by adversarial attacks. For
a training example x, f1 and f2 have the same sign, e.g.,
f1(x) = f2(x) = 1. The inconsistency happens when x
becomes x′ in the following two scenarios: i) the attacker
f2 remains the same but the attacked classifier f1 is over-
sensitive, i.e., f2(x′) = 1 but f1(x′) = −1; ii) f2 has observed
the difference but f1 is over-stable, i.e., f2(x′) = −1 but
f1(x
′) = 1.
These two types of adversarial attacks are described by
(1) and (2), respectively. Type II attack (1) has been in-
sightfully investigated for attack methods, defense strategies,
and theoretical analysis. But Type I attack has not been
seriously considered. As summarized in [8], until now, only
[23] considers Type I error, however, it is still based on small
variations and can be easily discovered. In this paper, we will
design a practical Type I attack by designing a supervised
variational autoencoder and by gradient updating.
A. Toy Example on Feature Interpretation
Before presenting the detailed technique, we here give a
toy example to demonstrate different underlying reasons for
Type I and Type II attack in Fig. 2, where yellow circles and
green crosses stand for positive and negative training samples.
3The data are in a 3-dimensional space and the oracle classifier
f2 uses x(1) and x(2) to distinguish samples. But trained on
these samples, f1 gets 100% accuracy by considering x(1)
and x(3). Thus, x(3) is an unnecessary feature that is not
considered by the oracle but is used in the classifier. Since
x(3) is an unnecessary feature, we can shift a true positive
along x(3) and the variant cannot be observed by the oracle
but makes the result of f1 change (Type II attack, the blue
arrow). The link between unnecessary features and Type II
adversarial attack has been theoretically discussed in [10].
To generate another type of adversarial example described in
(2), we need to attack missing features instead of unnecessary
ones. In Fig. 2, x(2) is taken into account in the oracle but
is omitted by f1. Since x(2) is missing, we can change the
sample along x(2) until it crosses the decision boundary of
f2 but has no influence on f1. The change is displayed by the
green arrow, by which we successfully generate an example
different to x in the view of the oracle but f1 keeps unchanged.
This toy example shows different essence for Type I and Type
II attack. To pursue an ideal classifier that can imitate the
oracle, it is required to study both unnecessary features by
Type II and missing features by Type I attack.
Negative training samples
Positive training samples
Type I adversarial example
Type II adversarial example
x(1)
x(2)
x(3)
f1
f2
T
y
p
e
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x
′
I
x
′
II
Fig. 2. f2 is the oracle classifier which uses x(1) and x(2) to distinguish
samples shown by green crosses and yellow circles. But trained on these
samples, f1 gets 100% accuracy by considering x(1) and x(3). Here x(3)
is an unnecessary feature such that shifting a true positive along x(3) cannot
be observed by the oracle but makes the result of f1 change (Type II attack,
the blue arrow). For Type I attack (the green arrow), the sample is moved
along x(2) (the missing feature) and an example different to x in the view
of the oracle but f1(x) = f1(x′) is generated.
Real applications are much more complicated than the
toy example in Fig. 2, mainly because the features are not
strictly orthogonal to each other. But the above feature space
interpretation implies that the underlying reasons for Type I
and Type II adversarial attacks are different, which follows that
the defense methods designed for one type may not work for
the other. In numerical experiments, we will show that some
defense methods designed for Type II attack do not help the
robustness to Type I attack. Worse still, if some method aims
at reducing unnecessary features for defending Type II attack,
it may make the classifier easier to be attacked by Type I.
Summarizingly, the existing Type II adversarial attack can
cheat a classifier by small perturbations that make the classifier
have undue change. The proposed Type I adversarial attack
cheats a classifier by significant change that is inappropriately
ignored by the classifier. The adversarial examples and the
generating process for Type II have been found to be inter-
esting and important to analyze neural networks. For most
of these topics, Type I attack is indispensable. Take classifier
evaluation based on adversarial attacks as an example, where
not only Type II error but also Type I error needs to be
considered. Another case is classifier strengthening by re-
training, for which adversarial examples generated by Type
I attack, like x′I in Fig. 2, cannot be found by Type II
attack. For neural network interpretation, investigating Type II
adversarial attack leads to unnecessary features, but missing
features can only be captured by Type I attack. Generally,
studying adversarial examples from both Type I and Type II
attack is helpful.
B. Toy Example on Sphere
To investigate adversarial attacks, an interesting example
to classify data from two concentric spheres with different
radiuses is designed by [24]. For this simple task, the follow-
ing single hidden layer network with a quadratic activation
function achieves very high accuracy:
f1(x) = w1·(Wx)2 + b, (3)
where x ∈ Rn and W ∈ Rh×n. According to [24], the above
network is equivalent to
f1(x) =
∑d
i=1
αizi
2 − 1, (4)
where z is a rotation of x and d is the rank of W . Based
on this equivalence, it was claimed in [24] that adversarial
examples could be easily found when h > n. Their conclusion
is restricted to Type II adversarial examples. In fact, when
h < n, there still exist Type I adversarial examples. An
intuitive explanation is that when h < n, n − h dimensions
of the input are missed by the classifier such that the values
on those dimensions can be arbitrarily modified while keeping
the classification result of f1 unchanged.
Numerically, we consider an experiment that n = 100, h =
90 and the samples are uniformly distributed on the concentric
spheres with radii being 0.8 and 1.0. Then a network in form
(3) is trained through one million steps with 64 batch size,
which means 64 million i.i.d. training samples are used in total.
After training, 100 thousand random samples are tested and
the error rate is less than 10−4, showing that we have already
obtained a very good classifier. For the obtained classifier, it
is hard to generate a Type II adversarial example, as claimed
by [24]. But still, from any sample x with ‖x‖2 = 0.8, we
can first transform it to z-space, set
z′i = zi,∀i = 1, 2, · · · , 90,
z′91 = z
′
92 = · · · = z′100 =
√
(1− 0.82)/10,
and obtain x′ from z′. Since the dimension z91, . . . , z100 are
missed by f1, the function value of the generated x′ is the
same as that of x but x′ has been moved to the outer sphere.
In practice when the network structure is not clear or the (back)
projection is intractable, we can move x to the outer sphere
4.
▽f2(xt)
▽f1(xt) = 0
Proj▽f1(xt)=0(▽f2(xt))
(attacking direction)
x
xt
x′
O
1
Fig. 3. Illustration of Type I adversarial attack on the sphere dataset [24]. The
attacking direction is project of the radial vector onto the surface Of1(xt) =
0, where xt is the sample generated at the t-th step.
by projecting a radial vector onto the surface Of1(x) = 0.
The trajectory from x to x′ is illustrated in Fig. 3, which also
indicates that the basic strategy of Type I adversarial attack
we will discuss in the following sections.
III. SUPERVISED VAE MODEL FOR TYPE I ATTACK
Finding an adversarial example to a vulnerable classifier
f1 is substantially an image generation task. Both of the two
types of attacks require the generated examples to belong to
the wrong classes. But for Type II adversarial attack defined
in (1), a violate example x′ could be generated by directly
manipulating the image space according to the gradients from
the f1(x): typically, x′ = x+∇xf1, which is the mainstream
approach, see, e.g., [6], [25], [26]. The term ∇xf1 is usually
meaningless and could be regarded as inconspicuous noise,
which follows that noise detection or de-noising can serve
as defenders for Type II attack. Such small disturbance is
effective for Type II attack, for which the corresponding
adversarial example remains unchanged in the view of the
attacker f2. However, for Type I attack, it is required to
generate an adversarial example that is different to the original
one in the view of the attacker. Thus, simply considering the
gradients in the image space is usually not sufficient. Instead,
we need to find a latent space that can capture the features
used in both f1 and f2. By doing so, we can modify the
latent variables and avoid undesirable noise or ghost when
reconstructing images from the latent space.
In Fig. 4, we show the designed framework for training the
latent space and generating Type I adversarial examples. For
the encoder, there are multiple possible paths and in this paper
we propose a supervised variational autoencoder (SVAE), i.e.,
the supervised extension of VAE. For attacking, the gradients
from f1 do not merely propagate to the input x′ of f1 as the
traditional methods do, but further to the latent variables z
through the decoder. At the same time, the gradients from the
attacker are used for revising z to obtain a new image x′ with
a different label through the decoder. During this process, an
equilibrium between f1 and f2 is needed to keep the output
of f1 unchanged for achieving the Type I attack.
A. Supervised Variational Autoencoder
Let us first explain the details of SVAE. Based on the
generative model of VAE for generating x in the image
x
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Fig. 4. The framework for generating Type I adversarial example from the
latent space. In this paper, SVAE is proposed for encoding.
space from latent variables z, which is modeled as p(x) =∫
p(x|z)p(z)dz, the supervised VAE can be described as
p(x, y) =
∫
p(x, y|z)p(z)dz, where y is the label information
from the attacker.
Similar to VAE, in order to optimize the supervised varia-
tional autoencoder model, we find a lower bound of p(x, y).
Assume q(z) is an arbitrary distribution in the latent space,
its distance to p(z|x, y) can be measured by Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergence:
KL[q(z)||p(z|x, y)] = Ez∼q[log(q(z))− log(p(z|x, y))]
= Ez∼q[log(q(z))− log(p(x, y|z))− log(p(z))]
+ log(p(x, y)).
The above can be rewritten as:
log(p(x, y))−KL[q(z)||p(z|x, y)]
= −KL[q(z)||p(z)] + Ez∼q[log(p(x, y|z))]
= −KL[q(z)||p(z)] + Ez∼q[log(p(y|z)) + log(p(x|y, z))].
The conditional generative methods [16], [27] that use label
information as a prior aim to separate the style and content
in the latent space. In our setting, latent variables z should
contain label information as in [28]. This is mainly due to
two reasons: firstly, the distribution in the latent space should
be constrained by the attacker according to their labels, which
enables the use of gradients from the attacker to modify the
generated image; secondly, as described in [10], the judgement
of the classifier is decided by a pseudometric measurement in
the latent space. Therefore, we replace p(x|y, z) by p(x|z)
since z contains the label information y. Then, a lower bound
of p(x, y) can be given as:
log(p(x, y)) ≥ −KL[q(z)||p(z)] + Ez∼q[log(p(y|z))]
+ Ez∼q[log(p(x|z))].
(5)
To simplify the optimization, we choose q(z) to be Gaussian
depending on x in the latent space, which is also assumed
in [5]. Specifically, q(z|x) = N (µ(x; θenc), σ(x; θenc)), from
which it follows that SVAE maximizes:
J = −KL[q(z|x)||p(z)] + Ez∼q(z|x)[log(p(y|z))]
+ Ez∼q(z|x)[log(p(x|z))]
, −(JKL + J2 + Jdec),
(6)
where the three terms are corresponding to the encoder, the
classifier, and the decoder in SVAE model, respectively. The
5classifier in SVAE imposes a restriction on latent variables to
generate images with desired labels through the decoder.
Generally, a classifier trained from data only fits well on
the manifold in the latent space of data but might have
bad behaviour outside [29]. Since we directly manipulate the
latent variables iteratively according to the gradients from the
attacker and the attacked classifier, a discriminator is necessary
to prevent the latent variables from lying outside the manifold
in the latent space while attacking. Consequently, the attacker
can provide a stable and effective direction for updating the la-
tent variables under the restraint of the discriminator. In SVAE,
the distribution of latent variables is standard Gaussian, which
makes a sample-based discriminator applicable. Specifically, a
binary discriminator with a sigmoid activation function on the
output layer is designed to distinguish the real latent values
encoded from input images by the decoder and the fake latent
values sampled randomly from Gaussian distribution:
Jdis = Eztrue∼q(z|x)[fdis(ztrue)]
+ Ezfake∼N (0,I)[1− fdis(zfake)].
(7)
A two-stage optimization method is utilized in this paper
to train SVAE. In the first stage, we simultaneously train
the encoder, the decoder, and the classifier to maximize the
objective function in (6). The encoder function fenc maps the
input x to a Gaussian distribution with its mean and variance
to be µ(x; θenc) and σ(x; θenc). By the reparameterization
trick [5], a latent variable z is sampled from such Gaussian
distribution, which is then used for classification and recovery
as f2 and fdec, respectively. A gradient descent method Γ,
e.g., Adam, is used for training parameters θenc, θ2, and θdec,
which are corresponding to fenc, f2, and fdec.
In the second stage, we train the discriminator fdis to
maximize (7) based on the well-located encoder after the first
training stage. The input x is first encoded into the Gaussian
with mean µ(x) and variance σ(x) in the latent space. Then the
positives are sampled from ztrue ∼ N (µ(x; θenc), σ(x; θenc)),
while the negatives are sampled from the standard Gaussian
zfake ∼ N (0, I). A gradient descent method Γ is applied to
only update the parameters θdis in the discriminator fdis. This
two stage optimization algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Two stage learning in SVAE
while stage1Training() do
x, y ← getMiniTrainingBatch()
z∼N (µ(x; θenc), σ(x; θenc))
(θenc, θdec, θora)←(θenc, θdec, θora)
+Γ( ∂J∂θenc ,
∂J
∂θdec
, ∂J∂θora )
end while
while stage2Traning() do
x, y ← getMiniTrainingBatch()
ztrue∼N (µ(x; θenc), σ(x; θenc))
zfake∼N (0, I)
θdis←θdis + Γ(∂Jdis∂θdis )
end while
B. Image Transition Task
Based on the trained SVAE, we are going to generate a
Type I adversarial example x′ from an original example x as
described in (2) such that x′ and x have different labels in the
view of f2 but are recognized as the same class by f1. The
first and an easier step is to transform the input image x into
another image x′ with a different label, which is an image
transition task. In our framework, the class information is not
directly given, e.g., in the conditional generation methods, but
comes from the supervised term in the attacker. The latent
variables are revised iteratively according to the gradients
from the f2 and recovered into images through the decoder.
Specifically, the objective function for generating targeted
examples is:
JIT = J2(z, y
′) + α(1− fdis(z)) + γ||z||2
= −y′logf2(z) + α(1− fdis(z)) + γ||z||2,
where the cross-entropy loss is applied to f2 and it is a
common choice in classification tasks [1], [2]. Besides, a loss
term with the weight α from discriminator fdis is also added
in order to prevent z from moving outside of the manifold
in the latent space. An l2 regularization term on z with the
weight γ is used to restrict z to locate in the standard Gaussian
space as the ambient space of the manifold.
Here, we utilize the established method for image transition
for digit images from MNIST and face images from CelebA.
For MNIST dataset, a classifier with 98.64% test accuracy is
established and then used to image transition: from an image
“i” to generate “i + 1”. For CelebA, a gender classifier with
94.9% test accuracy is established and used to change an
image’s gender. The transition performance is illustrated in
Fig. 5, where the left column represents the original image,
the right column shows the generated image with a desired
label, and the middle ones are transitory images in different
iterations.
Note that the image transition task is different to feature
transformation, for which the typical route is to establish
semantic features and change the required one; see, e.g.,
Fader Networks [30] and Deep Feature Interpolation [31].
The image transition here is implemented under the guide of
the classifier f2. For visuality, we choose f2 to be a gender
classifier, but it is not necessary to have semantic meaning
and could be comprehensive. The difference could also be
visually observed: the face generated by Fader Networks looks
very similar to the original one, since the features have been
decoupled; while in Fig.5(b), the generated and the original
one could be regarded as different persons.
C. Generating Adversarial Examples for Type I Attack
In the above image transition task, we successfully generate
new examples with desired labels. Further, incorporating the
attacked classifier f1 as illustrated in Fig. 4, we try to keep
the output of f1 unchanged, i.e., to generate Type I adversarial
examples as described in (2). For a classifier f1, an adversarial
example x′ with the target label y′ of an input x with the
original label y is generated through minimizing the following
function, where the trained SVAE model is the attacker,
6iterations
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Fig. 5. Illustration of supervised image class transition by SVAE on (a)
MNIST and (b) CelebA datasets. The target class for digital image i is i+1
(the target of “9” is “0”) and for male/female face images is the opposites.
JSA = JIT + ktJ1(x
′, y, ·)
= −y′logf2(z) + α(1− fdis(z)) + ktJ1(fdec(z), y, ·)
+ γ||z||2.
(8)
Here, J1(x′, ·) is the loss function of the attacked classifier
and may take different formulations for different tasks. In
multi-class classification tasks, e.g., [1], [2], f1(x) is a vector
of probabilities for each class. While in face recognition
tasks [32], f1(x) is a feature vector, where a small distance
||f1(x′) − f1(x)||2 means that x and x′ tend to be the same
person. For these two tasks, the J1(x′, ·) could be set as the
following,
J1(x
′, ·) =
{ −ylogf1(x′) classification tasks,
||f1(x′)− f1(x)||2 face recognition tasks.
(9)
In (8), there is a positive parameter kt reflecting the stress
we put to keep the attacked classifier f1 unchanged. In our
method, kt could vary for different iterations. Generally, at
the beginning, we allow variation on the output of f1 to really
change the image. Later, kt increases to pull the image back
such that the output of f1 is as the same as the original.
Specifically, a self-adaptive weight strategy is designed for
kt to maintain such equilibrium:
kt+1 = kt + η (βJ1(fdec(z), y, ·)− J2(z, y′)
+ max
{
J1(fdec(z), y, ·)− Jˆ1, 0
})
.
(10)
In our experiments, after increasing the equilibrium weight
in several iterations, kt is clipped into [0, 0.001]. The hyper-
parameter β, inspired by [33] to control the equilibrium
between the losses J1 and J2, is set as
β =
J2(z, y
′)
J1(x′, y, ·) =
J2(z, y
′)
J1(fdec(z), y, ·) . (11)
A lower β means that the generated adversarial sample x′ more
likely belong to the targeted label y′ yet the probability of
f2 judging that f2(x)6=f2(x′) is higher. In (10), an additional
term Jˆ1 is used as the target value for the attacked classifier. It
is introduced in a hinge loss term to sacrifice a little confidence
properly in f1 to concentrate more on f2 which makes the
input image really become a new image with different classes.
This term can improve the image quality and success rate for
Type I attack.
We update the latent variable z iteratively to minimize
the objective function in (8) after all those networks are
well trained. At the start, we initialize z to be the mean
of the Gaussian zinit = µ(fenc(x)) according to the given
input x. Similar to training networks, we here use Adam
[34] to optimize (8) on the latent variable z iteratively. The
overall algorithm for generating Type I adversarial examples
is illustrated in Algorithm 2. Obviously, 0 is a lower bound of
JSA in both classification and recognition tasks. Therefore, the
convergence is guaranteed when optimizing JSA through the
gradient descent methods. Codes are provided in supplemental
materials (SM) and will be published in the future.
Algorithm 2: Generating Type I Adversarial Attack
given input x
z0 ← µ(x; θenc) , k0←0, t←0
while not converging() do zt+1←zt + Γ(∂JSA∂z )
x′t+1←fdec(zt+1)
kt+1←kt + η(βJ1(x′t+1, y, ·)− J2(z, y′)+
max{J1(fdec(z), y, ·)− Jˆ1, 0})
kt+1←max{0,min{kt+1, 0.005}}
end while
x′ = fenc(zT ), T is the final time step
return x′.
D. Attack on Latent Space
The adversarial attacks reveal weaknesses of neural net-
works and provide tools to analyze neural networks. Although
most of the existing attacks are for image input, the attacks
may happen on non-image data. Recently, an interesting attack
on the latent space is designed by [15]. Suppose z is an original
vector in the latent space and that attack is to generate z′ such
that ‖z−z′‖ is small but via a generative model, e.g., AC-GAN
[17] is used in [15], the generated images G(z) and G(z′) are
7incorrectly identified by the attacked classifier f1 into different
classes, i.e., f1(G(z)) 6= f1(G(z′)). The original z could be
either given or randomly generated. This kind of attacks get
rid of the encoder and are applicable for non-image data.
From the above description, one could observe that the
attack designed in [15] belongs to Type II attack. Parallelly,
we could also design Type I attack on latent space, which is
mathematically described as the following problem,
From z Generate z′ = A(z)
s.t. f1(G(z
′)) = f1(G(z))
‖z − z′‖22 ≥ ε
, (12)
where f1 is the attacked classifier, G is a generative model,
and ε is a user-defined threshold. Actually, (12) is a special
case of (2), where we use a naı¨ve distance-based classifier as
the attacker. Basically, along a direction in the manifold where
f1(G(z)) keeps a constant, we can go away from z and find
Type I adversarial examples on the latent space. Specifically,
those adversarial examples could be generated by minimizing
the following loss function,
L(z′) = kJ1(G(z′), ·) + max
{
ε− ‖z′ − z‖22, 0
}
, (13)
where J1 is defined as (9), G is a generative model that has
been trained in advance, and k is a trade-off parameter. The
first term in (13) forces f1 to judge the two generated samples
G(z′) and G(z) to be the same class, while the second term
encourages z′ to leave the original z. A smaller k means we
allow a larger change on f1 in order to obtain a larger distance
in the latent space. We could design a self-adaptive strategy
as (10) for k but in this paper, we keep k unchanged during
the whole process. If an auxiliary classifier is modeled in G,
like AC-GAN [17] and is denoted by fG, then we could also
minimize the difference of fG(z′) and ytarget to assign a target
label, otherwise, the attack is untargeted.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In this section, we validate the proposed method for this
new type of adversarial attack. There are two main questions:
i) whether the proposed method can change an image signifi-
cantly but keep the attacked classifier unchanged; ii) whether
there is essential difference from the existing adversarial
attack. For the two purposes, we first validate the proposed
attack on MNIST dataset [35], where new generated digits will
be recognized as the original ones, and on CelebA dataset [36],
where new face images with different genders are generated
but will be identified as the same person. After that, we apply
defense methods to defend attacks. The different performance
of Type I and Type II attack confirms their essential difference.
At last, Type I attacks on latent space are evaluated, which also
shows the possibility of using different generative models for
Type I attack.
For SVAE training, we use Adam [34] with learning rate
0.0002. The hyper parameters α and γ in (8) are set to be 0.01
and 0.0001, respectively. β for equilibrium in (10) is 0.001.
During the attacking iterations, Adam is utilized to update
latent variable z with learning rate 0.005. The target loss Jˆ1
in (10) is set to 0.01 as the cross entropy loss for the digital
Fig. 6. Illustration of the log loss terms of the attacker f2, the discriminator
fdis and the MLP f1 by setting y′ = 5 and y = 4 in (8). The lower loss
of f1, the more it is believe the generated image belongs to class ”4”. Until
convergence, f1 still classifies it as ”4” with 99.41% confidence.
image classification task and 1.00 as the Euclidean distance for
the face recognition task. The detail of SVAE’s architectures
is provided in the SM. For datasets, MNIST contains 60K
handwritten digital images of size 28x28. Following the com-
mon split, we use 50K images for training and rest for test.
CelebA dataset includes more than 200K face images with
40 attribute annotations. We simply split CelebA dataset into
Male/Female subsets according to their gender labels, which
are then normalized and centrally cropped into size 64x64. All
the experiments in this paper are implemented in Tensorflow
[37] on an NVIDIA TITAN X GPU with 12GB memory.
A. Type I Attack on Digits Classifier
First we use the proposed method to attack a classifier
trained on MNIST dataset. The attacked classifier f1 is an
MLP with 128 hidden units and achieves 2.73% test error. We
train an SVAE model, which has 1.36% test error and serves
as the attacker f2. Then from a given image that has been
correctly classified by f1, we apply Algorithm 2 to generate
an adversarial example. The target is to change an “i” to an
“i+ 1” that is still wrongly classified as “i” by f1.
In Fig. 6, we illustrate the log loss terms of the attacker
f2, the discriminator fdis, and the MLP f1, when SVAE tries
to conduct a Type I attack to transform an image from “4”
to “5” while the MLP still classifies it as “4”. The images
on the top are the generated adversarial examples x′ at the
corresponding iterations. Notice that the loss for f2 is relative
to y′ = 5 while the loss for f1 is with respect to y = 4.
Therefore, at the beginning, the loss of f2 is much higher
than that of f1 due to the fact that the original image is the
number “4”. Then, through minimizing JSA in (8), the image
is gradually converted to number “5” while the loss of f1
is increasing, since the target loss Jˆ1 is set to 0.01 and the
weight for J1 in (10) is clipped into 0. At the same time,
the loss of the discriminator is increasing since the latent
variables have to walk beyond the manifold in the latent
space. When J1 increases beyond Jˆ1 and J2 is lower than
the equilibrium described in (11), the adaptive weight kt for
J1 increases to pull down J1 until convergence. Although the
loss of the attacker f2 decreases rapidly at the beginning, the
supervised information from the attacker is not very reliable
since its performance is unpredictable outside the manifold
8in the latent space. The discriminator, therefore, plays a key
role in restraining the latent variables into the manifold, which
makes the classifier in SVAE to provide convincible gradients.
In Fig. 7(a), we show some examples of Type I attack
on the digit classifier. The original images are plotted in
the left column, the generated ones are in the right column,
and the gradually changing process is shown between them.
The number marked on the top of each image indicates the
confidence of being the original class given by the attacked
classifier f1. During the attack, the confidence will first drop
and then increase, which coincides with our setting of k in
Algorithm 2, as discussed in Section III.C.
B. Type I Attack on Face Recognizer
Next, we evaluate the proposed attack on a face recognizer
FaceNet [32]. We directly use the FaceNet trained on CelebA,
which achieves 99.05% accuracy on LFW [38] dataset for face
recognition. The same face alignment, whitening, and other
pre-processing procedures are carried out as recommended
[32] in our experiment. An SVAE is trained on CelebA
dataset with a gender classification f2 of 94.9% accuracy.
Our task is to transform the gender of an image but keep
it recognized as the same person by the FaceNet. There is an
interesting difference between this task and the previous one.
In the previous task, the attacker is stronger than the attacked
classifier. But for this task, the SVAE classification accuracy
is lower than the attacked FaceNet. Moreover, being the same
gender is a necessary condition of the same person and the
network of FaceNet is much deeper and more complicated.
Even in the case that f1 is stronger than f2, the proposed
Type I attack could succeed.
Some typical adversarial examples are given in Fig. 7 (b).
For each pair, the left face is in CelebA and the right one is
generated by Algorithm 2. The number above the images are
the distances given by the FaceNet, for which the threshold of
being the same person is suggested to be 1.242 by [32].
To evaluate the success rate of Type I attack, we generate
adversarial examples from the first 1000 images of the valida-
tion set in CelebA. When saying that the attack is successful,
we mean the image pair (x, x′) satisfies three conditions: i)
f1(x) = f1(x
′), i.e., the two faces are recognized as the same
person by the FaceNet; ii) f2(x) 6= f2(x′), i.e., they are of
different genders in the view of f2 and are not the same person;
iii) x′ is indeed a face. The latter two criteria are judged by
thirty annotators and the average successful rate is 69.8%. All
the generated faces are provided in SM for reference.
C. Type I Attack Defenses by Detecting
The above two experiments validate the effectiveness of
generating Type I adversarial examples. As previously dis-
cussed, Type II attack reflects the over-sensitivity and the
Type I attack relies on the over-stability of the classifier.
Since the underlying reasons are different, we expect that
defense strategies designed for Type II attack by detecting the
adversarial input do not help much for Type I attack.
To validate this corollary, we use the proposed method to
attack the MLP with a feature squeezing defense strategy [39]
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Fig. 7. (a) Adversarial examples with the probabilities according to iteration
steps on MNIST dataset. (b) Adversarial example pairs with Euclidean
distance on the top measured by FaceNet. Note that 1.242 is the distance
threshold adopted by FaceNet to judge whether two images are from the
same person.
that is the most effective defense strategy and has shown great
potential to counter many existing Type II attacks. The feature
squeezing defense strategy is to detect adversarial examples by
reducing the degree of input features available to adversarial
examples. Specifically, it calculates the distance between the
classifiers’ prediction (e.g., the output of the softmax layer) of
the input sample and its squeezing one. If the distance is larger
than a given threshold, the defense method regards the input
sample as an adversarial example and refuses to classify this
sample. The defense strategy can be summarized as bellow:
f˜1(x) =
{
f1(x), D(f1(x), f1(F (x))) < ζ,
reject, otherwise,
where F (x) is the feature squeezing strategy, D(·, ·) is a
distance metric, and ζ is the hyper-parameter serving as a
9threshold to judge whether the input x is an adversarial
example (then reject it) or not. Following the common setting
in [39], the joint squeezers with one bit depth reduction and a
2×2 median smoothing are set for the feature squeezing strat-
egy F , which presents the highest detection rate as revealed in
[39]. The distance metric D is chosen to be Euclidean distance.
We randomly choose 500 samples on MNIST test set and
calculate the detection rate on clean test samples, their Type I
adversarial examples, and their Type II adversarial examples
with different thresholds. Type I and Type II adversarial
examples are generated by Algorithm 2 (SVAE), FGSM [6],
DeepFool [25], CW [12], and EAD [13], respectively. The
detection rates, i.e., the rate of being recognized as adversarial
examples by the detector, for the clean samples, Type I
adversarial examples, and Type II adversarial examples are
listed in Table I. For different ζ values, the detection rates
for clean and Type I adversarial examples have no significant
difference, which means that Type I adversarial examples
cannot be well distinguished from clean data. By contrast, the
detection ratio for Type II adversarial examples is significantly
higher than that for clean data, showing that feature squeezing
is a good detection method for Type II attack, but does not
work for Type I attack.
TABLE I
DETECTION RATES ON MNIST TEST SET, TYPE I ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLES AND TYPE II ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES WITH DIFFERENT
THRESHOLDS.
ζ 0.2510 0.6089 0.9353
Clean 0.234 0.102 0.050
Type II
FGSM [6] 0.870 0.776 0.726
DeepFool [25] 0.998 0.974 0.872
CW l2 [12] 0.998 0.976 0.842
EAD [13] 0.998 0.980 0.902
Type I SVAE 0.306 0.122 0.076
Similar phenomenon on the feature squeezing could also
be observed in attacking FaceNet, for which 1000 Type I
adversarial examples are generated as described in Section
IV.B. The same number of Type II adversarial examples are
generated by the projected gradient descent (PGD, [14]). We
set ζ = 1.2 and consider different sizes of the smoothing
kernel. The detection rates can be found in Table II, showing
that feature squeezing does not help for Type I attack since
Type I attack is not built on adding noise.
TABLE II
DETECTION RATES ON CELEBA TEST SET THROUGH THE FEATURE
SQUEEZING DEFENSE METHOD.
Filter size Clean Type I (SVAE) Type II (PGD)
3×3 0.000 0.000 0.487
5×5 0.064 0.032 0.971
D. Type I Attack Defenses by Strengthening
Feeding back the adversarial examples to re-train the classi-
fier is another method to increase the robustness of networks.
In the following, we use MNIST dataset to test the defending
performance of Adversarial Logit Pairing [40], which is de-
signed for Type II adversarial examples. The attacked classifier
is LeNet [41]. After strengthening, adversarial examples gener-
ated by attacking the original networks are used for validation.
The accuracy for Type II attack is improved to 98.5%, since
minimizing the pairwise logit pairing loss L(f(x), f(x′)) that
requires a small distance between the original example x and
the adversarial one x′ is helpful. However, this setting does not
work for Type I attack: if x′ is generated by Type I attack, then
x and x′ do not belong to the same class and L(f(x), f(x′))
is not expected to be small. In our experiment, the accuracy
for Type I attack is only 14.2%, verifying that the logit pairing
technique cannot be directly used for the Type I adversarial
examples.
As suggested and numerically verified by [42], adding
adversarial examples generated from other attacks is helpful,
which is based on the transferability across different models
and attack methods. An interesting question is that whether
the capability of defending one type of adversarial attack
could help against another type. To answer this question, we
strengthen FaceNet by Type I, Type II (FGSM), and Type II
(PGD) adversarial examples, respectively. For Type II attack,
we use the adversarial logit pairing method. For Type I attack,
the adversarial logit pairing does not help as shown before, so
we turn to vanilla adversarial training. Specifically, adversarial
examples generated by attacking the original networks are
randomly split into two parts with equal probability. One
subset is sent back together with LFW dataset for adversarial
training. Then strengthened FaceNets are evaluated on the
rest adversarial examples. The classification accuracy could
be found in Table III. The diagonal shows the performance of
defending the adversarial attack by adversarial training on the
same attack method. Other elements show the transferability of
adversarial training. One could find that strengthening FaceNet
by FGSM can improve the robustness against PGD; and vice
versa. However, strengthening by Type II adversarial examples
has little effect on defending Type I attack, showing their
difference.
TABLE III
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF FACENET STRENGTHENED BY DIFFERENT
ATTACK METHODS ON ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Type I Type II Type II
strengthened LFW (SVAE) (FGSM) (PGD)
by SVAE 0.990 0.554 0.987 0.998
by FGSM 0.995 0.110 1.000 0.996
by PGD 0.997 0.140 0.998 1.000
E. Type I Attack on Latent Space
In the last experiment, we will consider Type I attack on
latent spaces. Attacks could happen on non-image data. But
to visualize the performance, we apply a generative model
to transfer a latent vector to an image. The attack design is
independent of the generative model. For attacking LeNet [41]
on MNIST, we choose AC-GAN [17], which is also used in
[15]. For attacking FaceNet on CelebA [36], we use StyleGAN
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[18], which is one of the state-of-the-art generative models.
We train an AC-GAN with 128 latent features on MNIST
and use StyleGAN with 512 latent features provided by [18].
Since these generative models only affect the visual quality but
have no difference on attack performance, we do not report
their structures and training details here. Based on trained
generative models, we attack the classifier f1 by minimizing
(13), where the hyper-parameters are set as k = 10−2, ε = 0.1
for attacking LeNet, and k = 10−3, ε = 0.35 for attacking
FaceNet, respectively. Adam with the learning rate 0.01 is
used.
In Fig. 8, Type I attack on latent space is displayed by
plotting the generative images (in 28×28) by AC-GAN. Each
pair of those digits are visually different, however, they are
identified to the same class by the attacked LeNet. Since AC-
GAN has an auxiliary classifier, we can utilize this classifier
to set a target label.
Fig. 8. Type I attack performance on the latent space of AC-GAN. For each
pair of the digits, the attacked LeNet correctly recognizes the left digit but
incorrectly thinks the right one belongs to the same class.
In Fig. 9, we display 6 face sequences generated by the Type
I adversarial attack on the latent space of StyleGAN. Thanks
to the great generative ability of StyleGAN, the adversarial
images are in the size of 1024x1024. Starting from the left face
in each row, the attack significantly changes the appearance.
However, the attacked FaceNet still recognizes them as the
same person. Differently to the attack shown in Fig.7(b),
the attack based on StyleGAN can not control the change
direction, e.g., from male to female or the opposite. In the
future, it is of great interest to implement targeted Type I
attack based on StyleGAN or other generative models.
V. CONCLUSION
False positive and false negative rates are important evalua-
tion criteria for the performance of classifiers, thus, adversarial
attacks aiming at false positivists (Type I attack, proposed
in this paper) and at false negatives (Type II attack, the
current popular ones) are both deserved to be investigated.
The inconsistency in the feature spaces makes classifiers
vulnerable. But the underlying reasons for Type I and Type
II attack are different: Type I attack relies on the missing
features that are utilized by the attacker but are ignored
by the attacked classifier, while Type II attack modifies the
unnecessary features that are meaningless for the attacker but
are concerned by the attacked classifier.
To generate false positives is to cheat a classifier by signif-
icant changes. The generative target is a totally new sample
that is misclassified into the same class of the original by the
Fig. 9. Type I attack on the latent variables of StyleGAN. The left column
shows the generated faces corresponding to the starting latent variable, the
right column shows the attack results, and the intermediate images are
displayed in the middle. The image size is 1024× 1024. For all the 6 rows,
the distances judged by FaceNet between the left and the right are: 0.6780,
0.6321, 0.7632, 1.0482, 0.6448, and 1.0449 (from top to bottom), which are
all below 1.242. Though the appearances have been changed significantly, the
faces in each row are still identified as a same person by FaceNet.
attacked classifier. For Type I adversarial attack, a supervised
variational auto-encoder framework is designed as a generative
method. In this framework, the attacker is modeled explicitly
to provide supervised information for generating a new and
meaningful adversarial example. Rather than directly manip-
ulating in the image space which leads to noise eventually, a
generating algorithm for Type I attack is then established by
revising the latent variables in the latent space according to
the gradients from both the attacker and the attacked classifier,
and then those updated variables are recovered into images
through a decoder. In order to obtain stable and convincible
gradients from the attacker, a discriminator is designed to
restrict latent variables to locate on the manifold through the
iterative generating algorithm.
In numerical experiments, the proposed method successfully
generates Type I adversarial examples to cheat well trained
classifiers. Most of these examples can pass feature squeezing
detection, an efficient detection method for Type II attack,
implying the different essential reasons for Type I and Type
II attack. Because of the difference, the current strengthening
methods do not have type-crosses capability, i.e., retraining
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neural networks by Type II adversarial examples have no ben-
efits on defending Type I attack. Generally, Type I adversarial
attack is a new adversarial attack and is of great importance
for understanding neural networks. The proposed method is
only one way to generate Type I adversarial examples and
other architectures with auto-encoder and generative capability
are also promising for Type I attack, which can be used for
classifier evaluation, classifier re-training, and feature analysis.
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